AI/ ai · llm-interpretability · ai-safety · evaluation

Minerva-7B Knows Right From Wrong, Won't Always Say So

A white-box audit of Minerva-7B-Instruct-v1.0 finds the model often knows a request is risky internally but answers as if it doesn't.

Minerva-7B-Instruct-v1.0 often knows a request is risky, then answers as though it doesn't.

Researchers built an internal auditing method called LLM endognostics that reads and manipulates a model's residual stream instead of just grading its outputs. Tested on Minerva-7B-Instruct-v1.0 across 124 matched prompt pairs spanning 12 categories of professional risk, the model gave identical answers - both complying or both refusing - on 63.7% of pairs, meaning its outward behavior often showed no distinction at all. A Jacobian-based projection of its internal activations found the model was still representing that distinction internally, a gap the authors call the Contrastive Endognostic Margin. A second test crossing 25 facts with five phrasings found the model went along with a false premise 72% of the time even though its internal layers still encoded the true answer; surgically removing the internal direction tied to that false premise restored the correct answer in 11 of 25 cases.

The finding suggests grading a model purely on its outputs can miss what it actually knows, at least for this model under these test conditions. It also complicates a popular shortcut in interpretability work: a linear probe hit 77% accuracy reading out the same information, but ablating that probe's direction did nothing to change the model's answers - showing decodable information and causally load-bearing information are not the same thing.

One 7B model's internal quirks are not proof every aligned chatbot is secretly holding back. But it is a reminder that a refusal and an absence of knowledge are different claims, and right now most evaluations cannot tell them apart.

TR

The Revision

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