The FBI has seized 13 websites it says China operated to recruit current and former U.S. government personnel holding security clearances.
The sites posed as consulting firms — mundane enough to pass a casual search, the kind of outfit that advertises competitive rates for policy expertise and appears credible to someone refreshing their job search. According to the FBI, they were fronts for a Chinese recruitment operation. The bureau has not said publicly whether any current or former officials were successfully recruited, or named the specific intelligence service it believes was behind the network.
The consulting-to-government revolving door is a well-documented soft target in counterintelligence. Former officials with active or recently lapsed clearances carry institutional knowledge that is genuinely valuable to foreign services, and a convincing fake firm is harder to screen out than a cold approach. Building the infrastructure to meet potential recruits where they already look for work is, as tradecraft goes, straightforward.
The U.S. has publicly attributed a string of Chinese intelligence operations over the past several years — indictments, sanctions, infrastructure takedowns — without visibly slowing them. Thirteen seized websites is a data point, not a deterrent.